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Abstract 
Judging the strength of an argument may underlie many reasoning and decision- 
making tasks. In this article, we focus on “category-based” arguments, in which the 
premises and conclusion are of the form All members of C have property P, where 
C is a natural category. An example is “Dobermanns have sesamoid bones. 
Therefore, German shepherds have sesamoid bones. ” The strength of such an 
argument is reflected in the judged probability that the conclusion is true given that 
the premises are true. The processes that mediate such probability judgments 
depend on whether the predicate is “blank” - an unfamiliar property that does not 
enter the reasoning process (e.g., “have sesamoid bones “) - or “non-blank” - a 
relatively familiar property that is easier to reason from (e.g., “can bite through 
wire”). With blank predicates, probability judgments are based on similarity 
relations between the premise and conclusion categories. With non-blank predi- 
cates, probability judgements are based on both similarity relations and the 
plausibility of premises and conclusion. 
Introduction 
Reasoning and decision making in the face of uncertainty often require one to 
estimate the probabilities of uncertain events. In a series of influential studies, 
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Kahneman and Tversky (e.g., 1973, Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) demonstrated 
that lay people base their intuitive estimates of probability on decision heuristics, 
which, though often useful, sometimes yield normatively incorrect judgments. 
One such heuristic estimates the probability that individual i has property P in 
terms of how representative i is of P. Many empirical studies of this heuristic have 
involved a paradigm in which subjects are presented with a description of a 
hypothetical person, and asked to estimate the probability that the person is an 
instance of a target category; for example, “Linda is 31, liberal, and outspoken. 
What is the probability that she is a social worker?” In cases like this, the 
representativeness of the individual reduces to the typicality of the instance in the 
target-category - roughly, how good an example the instance is of the category - 
and the critical finding is that probability judgments are an increasing function of 
typicality (Shafir, Smith, & Osherson, 1990). 
The Kahneman-Tversky paradigm bears on contexts in which one needs to 
estimate the probability that an object belongs to a particular category. There is, 
however, another natural paradigm in which instances and categories are used to 
support probability judgments. In this paradigm, subjects are informed that some 
members of a category have a particular property, and then have to estimate the 
probability that other members have the property as well; for example, “A 
majority of surgeons oppose socialized medicine. What is the probability that a 
majority of internists do so as well. 7” These inferences are said to be “category 
based”. Presumably, subjects are treating surgeons and internists as subsets of the 
category of physicians, and this categorization plays a role in the inference 
process. Like the judgments studied by Kahneman and Tversky, category-based 
judgments occur frequently in everyday life, and seem to be based on heuristics 
rather than normative principles (Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez, 2% Shafir, 
1990). Such judgments are the concern of this paper. 
Distinctions 
To structure our report, we need to introduce some terminology and distinc- 
tions. Note first that any probability question can be characterized as an 
argument, in which the known propositions are the premises of the argument and 
the proposition whose probability is in question is the conclusion of the argument. 
To illustrate, the preceding example amounts to the following argument (where 
the statement above the line is the premise, and the one below the line is the 
conclusion): 
(1) A majority of surgeons oppose socialized medicine 
A majority of internists oppose socialized medicine 
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In providing further examples, it is useful to switch to biological categories like 
birds and mammals, because there seems to be more consensus among people 
about the subsets of such categories than about the subsets of social categories. 
Two further examples of category-based arguments are: 
(2) 
(3) 
Robins have sesamoid bones 
Ducks have sesamoid bones 
All birds have sesamoid bones 
Robins have sesamoid bones 
Ducks have sesamoid bones 
Sparrows have sesamoid bones 
In both cases, a subject might be asked to estimate the probability that the 
conclusion is true given that the premises are true. 
Arguments like (2) are distinguished by the fact that the conclusion category, 
BIRD, properly includes the premise categories, ROBIN and DUCK; such 
arguments are said to be “general” (from here on in, we use capitals to indicate 
categories). In arguments like (3), in contrast, all categories are at the same 
hierarchical level; these arguments are said to be “specific”. In this paper, we 
focus on specific arguments, though there will be some mention of general 
arguments.’ 
Another distinction concerns properties or predicates. Having sesamoid bones 
is a recognizable biological property, but not one that most people are familiar 
with, or can readily reason about. Such predicates are called “blank”. They are to 
be distinguished from non-blank predicates like can fly faster than 20 miles an 
hour; we are familiar with, and can reason about, such a predicate. A rough test 
of whether a predicate is blank or not is whether it applies equally to all 
categories in a domain, or instead characterizes some categories better than 
others. Having sesamoid bones, for instance, seems no more likely of one bird 
species than another, whereas can fly faster than 20 miles per hour clearly 
characterizes some birds (e.g., hawks and eagles) better than others (e.g., 
chickens and ducks). This distinction between blank and non-blank predicates is a 
major concern of the present paper. To preview our results, we will show that: 
with blank predicates, judgments of probability are based mostly on similarity and 
typicality relations between premise and conclusion categories, just as they are in 
‘Specific arguments can also be distinguished by the fact that any natural category (e.g., BIRD) 
that properly includes any of the premise categories or the conclusion category properly includes the 
others as well. Arguments that are neither specific nor general are referred to as “mixed”. For 
discussion of mixed arguments, see Osherson et al. (1990). 
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the representativeness heuristic; with non-blank predicates, however, probability 
judgments are based not only on similarity relations, but also on the plausibility of 
the premises and conclusion. 
With this as background we can state our agenda. In the next section we 
consider category-based arguments with blank predicates. We will be brief here 
because much of the relevant research has appeared elsewhere (see Osherson et 
al., 1990; Osherson, Stern, Wilkie, Stob, & Smith, 1991; Smith, Lopez, & 
Osherson, 1992). In the third section we turn our attention to non-blank 
predicates. We present a model of how people reason about such predicates when 
judging the strength of arguments, along with some relevant data. Concluding 
remarks occupy the fourth and final section. 
Category-based arguments with blank predicates 
Factors that affect probability judgment 
We are interested in factors that affect probability judgments about specific 
arguments. To uncover these factors, we presented 40 University of Michigan 
undergraduates with a series of 24 arguments, and asked them to estimate the 
probability of each conclusion on the assumption that the respective premises 
were true. Certain pairs of arguments offered contrasts that differed on only one 
factor, and these contrasts provide evidence for a number of phenomena. Four 
such phenomena are considered below. 
One contrasting pair of arguments consisted of: 
(44 
(4b) 
Tigers use serotonin as a neurotransmitter 
Cougars use serotonin as a neurotransmitter 
Bobcats use serotonin as a neurotransmitter 
Tigers use serotonin as a neurotransmitter 
Cougars use serotonin as a neurotransmitter 
L.861 
I.391 
Giraffes use serotonin as a neurotransmitter 
The numbers in brackets indicate the average conditional probability that 
subjects assigned to that particular argument (i.e., the probability they assigned 
to the conclusion being true, given that the premises were true). The two 
arguments in (4) differ with respect to the similarity of the premise categories to 
the conclusion category, this similarity being greater in (4a) than (4b); clearly, 
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Table 1. Some phenomena involving specific arguments 
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subjects favored conclusions that were more similar to the premises. We refer to 
this effect as the “premise-conclusion similarity” phenomenon. 
Table 1 lists three phenomena involving specific arguments that emerged from 
this study plus a fourth phenomenon that is due to Rips (1975). The first column 
of the table names the phenomenon. The second and third columns give the 
premise and conclusion categories used in the contrasting pair of arguments that 
define the phenomena. Column 2 lists arguments judged more probable (the 
“stronger” arguments), and Column 3 the less probable (or “weaker”) argu- 
ments. The arguments are presented in the format “premise category . . ./ 
conclusion category”, with the blank predicate being suppressed. The difference 
between the stronger and weaker argument is statistically significant in most cases 
by a sign test. 
After premise-conclusion similarity, the next phenomenon listed in Table 1 is 
asymmetry. It is defined only for single-premise arguments, and reveals that such 
arguments need not be symmetric. In particular, a single-premise argument will 
be judged more probable when the more typical category is in the premise than in 
the conclusion. For example, lions having a particular property makes it more 
probable that bats do, than vice versa. This asymmetry phenomenon is closely 
related to a phenomenon reported by Rips (1975), which we term the “typicality” 
phenomenon. It is listed as the third phenomenon in Table 1; it says that, other 
things being equal, arguments with more typical premise categories (e.g., 
HORSE) are judged more probable than those with less typical premise 
categories (e.g., PIG), even when the similarity between premise and conclusion 
categories is kept constant. The fourth phenomenon in the table is “premise 
diversity”. This phenomenon shows that, other things being equal, the more 
diverse, or dissimilar, the premise categories, the more probable the argument is 
judged. Chimpanzees and foxes sharing a common property makes it more 
probable that polar bears have it, than does the fact that wolves and foxes share 
the same property. Note that more diverse premise categories may not be more 
typical, or more similar, to the conclusion category; for example, in the preceding 
example, the occurrence of chimpanzees increases diversity but not typicality or 
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similarity to the conclusion. In what follows, we focus on the four phenomena of 
Table 1. 
The similarity coverage model 
To explain the preceding phenomena, among others, Osherson et al. (1990) 
advanced the similarity coverage model. This is a model of argument strength, 
where “strength” refers to the extent to which belief in an argument’s premises 
causes the reasoner to believe in the argument’s conclusion. When an argument’s 
predicate is blank, its strength is captured by the judged probability of the 
conclusion given the premises, since prior belief in the conclusion plays no role. 
In such cases, a model of argument strength can also serve as a model of 
conditional probability judgment. Although the similarity coverage model applies 
both to general and to specific arguments of this kind, we focus on the latter in 
what follows. 
The model 
According to the model, the judged probability of an argument depends on 
two variables: 
(i) The similarity of the premise categories to the conclusion category. 
(ii) The extent to which the premise categories “cover” the lowest-level category 
that includes the premise and conclusion categories. 
The first, or “similarity”, term is straightforward; the only wrinkle is that when 
there are multiple premises, similarity is determined by a maximum rule. For 
argument (3), for example, the similarity term consists of the maximum similarity 
of robins or ducks on the one hand, to sparrows on the other. One piece of 
evidence for the maximum rule is that argument (3) does not change much in 
strength if the premise about ducks is removed. More generally, the maximum 
rule captures the intuition that, when judging the probability that a conclusion 
category has a particular property, we pay most of our attention to the most 
similar premise category. 
The second, or “coverage”, term of the model requires more unpacking. Note 
first that it presupposes that subjects judging a specific argument generate a more 
general category, namely, the lowest-level category that includes the premise and 
conclusion categories. We refer to this category as the “inclusive” category. For 
argument (4a), the inclusive category might be FELINE; for argument (4b), the 
inclusive category might be MAMMAL. The introduction of an inclusive category 
captures the intuition that when informed, for example, that tigers and cougars 
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have a property, the subject considers the possibility that all felines have the 
property and, therefore, that bobcats do. The judgment of a specific argument 
thus includes the generation of a general argument. The strength of this general 
argument is evaluated by computing the extent to which its premises, for 
example, tigers and cougars, “cover” the inclusive category, for example, 
FELINE. 
We now need to explicate the notion of “coverage”. Intuitively, members of a 
general category cover that category to the extent that, on average, they are 
similar to other members. As an aid to intuition, Fig. 1 contains a two- 
dimensional representation - obtained by multidimensional scaling - of the 
similarities between various instances of the concept FRUIT (Tversky & Hutchin- 
son, 1986). Similarity here is reflected by closeness in the space. If we restrict our 
attention to the coverage provided by single members, typical members like 
APPLE or PLUM cover the space better than atypical members like COCONUT 
or OLIVE; that is, the average metric distance of APPLE or PLUM to all other 
instances in Fig. 1 is less than that of COCONUT or OLIVE to all other instances 
in Fig. 1. The fact that a typical member provides relatively good coverage of a 
category gives us insight into why single-premise arguments with typical premise 
categories tend to be judged stronger than arguments with atypical premise 
categories, as revealed in the asymmetry and typicality phenomena. If we 
consider the coverage provided by multiple members of a category, however, 
Figure 1. A two-dimensional space for representing the similarity relations among 20 instances of 
fruit. From Tversky and Hutchinson (1986). 
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more than typicality is involved. Intuitively, APPLE, PLUM, and ORANGE 
cover the space in Fig. 1 less well than do COCONUT, GRAPEFRUIT, and 
BLUEBERRY, even though the former are generally more typical than the latter. 
This difference in coverage arises because whatever category member is close to 
APPLE is also close to PLUM and ORANGE, so PLUM and ORANGE add 
little by way of coverage; in contrast, there are some members that are close to 
GRAPEFRUIT or BLUEBERRY but not to COCONUT, so GRAPEFRUIT 
and BLUEBERRY are adding coverage. This gives us insight into the diversity 
phenomenon. 
Thus, a subset of a general category covers that category to the extent that, for 
any member of the latter you think of, at least one member of the former is 
similar to it. This statement leads naturally to an algebraic definition of coverage. 
Let Pi . . . P,/C be a general argument with premise categories CAT (P,) . . 
CAT(P,) and conclusion category CAT(C). Furthermore, let c, . . c, be 
instances of CAT(C) that a person judging the argument considers (perhaps 
unconsciously). And let SIM(CAT(P,), cj) be the similarity between premise- 
category P, and conclusion-category instance c,. Then the coverage of an 
argument, which we will denote by COV(CAT(P,) . . CAT(P,); CAT(C)), is 
defined as the average of: 
MAX[SIM(CAT(P,), ci), . , SIM(CAT(P,J, c,)] 
MAX[SIM(CAT(P,), c2), . . , SIM(CAT(P,), c2)] 
MAX[SIM(CAT(P,), c,), . . . , SIM(CAT(P,), c,)] 
Coverage, then, is the average maximum similarity between (sampled) con- 
clusion-category instances and premise categories. Returning to argument (4a), 
for which FELINE is presumably the inclusive category, the coverage term of the 
argument would be given by COV(TIGER, COUGAR; FELINE), and might 
include terms like: 
MAX[SIM(TIGER, LEOPARD), SIM(COUGAR, LEOPARD)]; and 
MAX[SIM(TIGER, HOUSECAT), SIM(COUGAR, HOUSECAT)] 
Note that in the special case of single-premise arguments, such as TIGER/ 
COUGAR, there is no maximum to consider. Hence, COV(CAT(P); CAT(C)) is 
simply the average similarity of the premise category to instances of the 
conclusion category. Coverage therefore reduces to the typicality of the premise 
category in the conclusion category (this fits with our geometric representation in 
Fig. 1). 
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Combining the similarity and coverage terms, our final model of argument 
strength is given by: 
(cz) MAX[SIM(CAT(P,), CAT(C)), . . . , SIM(CAT(P,,J, CAT(C))] 
+ (1 - a) COV[(CAT(P,), . . . , CAT(P,); INCLUSIVE CATEGORY] 
The positive constant LY(O d (Y 6 1) indicates the weight given to the similarity 
term: the weight given to coverage is simply 1 - cr.’ 
Applications of the model 
The similarity coverage model readily explains the four phenomena described 
earlier. The first phenomenon was premise-conclusion similarity, and we illus- 
trated it by showing that an argument with premise categories TIGER and 
COUGAR and conclusion category BOBCAT is judged more probable than an 
argument with the same premise categories but conclusion category GIRAFFE. 
Assume that the inclusive category for the former argument is FELINE and that 
for the latter argument is MAMMAL. Then, according to the model, the 
strengths of the two arguments are given by: 
(a) 
(b) 
(cry> MAX[SIM(TIGER, BOBCAT), SIM(COUGAR, BOBCAT)] 
+ (1 - CZ) COV[TIGER, COUGAR; FELINE]; and 
((.y) MAX[SIM(TIGER, GIRAFFE), SIM(COUGAR, GIRAFFE)] 
+ (1 - a) COV[TIGER, COUGAR; MAMMAL] 
The similarity term is clearly greater for (a) than (b). The coverage term is also 
greater for (a) than (b), because tigers and cougars are more similar on average to 
other cats than to other mammals. This explains why argument (4a) is judged the 
stronger. 
Consider next the typicality phenomenon, which we illustrated by the argu- 
ment HORSE/GOAT being judged more probable than the argument PIG/ 
GOAT. Because Rips (1975) selected these items so that the similarity between 
premise and conclusion categories was held constant, we can focus on just the 
coverage term. Since MAMMAL is presumably the inclusive category for both 
arguments, for the model to predict the result of interest, the coverage of 
(HORSE; MAMMAL) must exceed that of (PIG; MAMMAL). Because cover- 
age for single-premise arguments reduces to typicality, and because HORSE is in 
fact a more typical MAMMAL than is PIG, the result is accounted for. By a 
comparable line of reasoning, the asymmetry phenomenon is accounted for. 
The last phenomenon to consider is that of premise diversity, which we 
‘In Osherson et al.‘s (1990) analysis, coverage and CI are defined for each particular individual. In 
the present treatment they are assumed to be the same for all individuals under consideration for ease 
of exposition. 
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illustrated by showing that CHIMPANZEE, FOX/POLAR BEAR is judged 
stronger than WOLF, FOX/POLAR BEAR. The items were selected so that the 
premise categories that differ between the arguments, CHIMPANZEE and 
WOLF, were roughly equally similar to the conclusion category. Hence, the 
similarity terms for the two arguments are roughly the same, and again we can 
focus on the coverage terms. Assuming that the inclusive category for both 
arguments is MAMMAL, coverage for the stronger or more probable argument 
might include terms such as: 
MAX[SIM(CHIMPANZEE, SQUIRREL), SIM(FOX, SQUIRREL)]; and 
MAX[ SIM( CHIMPANZEE, MONKEY), SIM( FOX, MONKEY)] 
Coverage for the weaker argument might include terms such as: 
MAX[SIM(WOLF, SQUIRREL), SIM(FOX, SQUIRREL)]; and 
MAX[SIM(WOLF, MONKEY), SIM(FOX, MONKEY)] 
When the sampled conclusion instance is SQUIRREL, there should be little 
difference between the two arguments; that is, it is doubtful that WOLF is 
appreciably more similar to SQUIRREL than FOX is. However, when the 
sampled instance is MONKEY, the maximum similarity will be greater in the 
more diverse argument because CHIMPANZEE is more similar to MONKEY 
than WOLF is. More generally, only for the diverse argument will there be some 
conclusion instances that are covered by the second premise but not the first. 
Considerations like these account for the premise diversity phenomenon. 
The preceding applications of the similarity coverage model comprise only a 
small part of the empirical support for the model. Osherson et al. (1990) present 
other phenomena that are predicted by the model. This same paper also presents 
the results of several experiments which show that the similarity coverage model 
provides a quantitative account of strength or probability judgments to specific 
and general arguments. Smith et al. (1992) provide additional experiments and 
quantitative tests of the model, and Osherson et al. (1991) show that a variant of 
the model quantitatively predicts strength or probability judgments on an 
individual subject basis. 
Both the similarity and coverage terms of the model reflect similarity relations. 
This makes the model a close relative to the representativeness heuristic of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1973), which often reduces to similarity and typicality 
(Shafir et al., 1990). Things change substantially, however, when the predicates in 
our paradigm are accorded a more familiar content. 
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Category-based arguments with non-blank predicates 
Counter-examples to the phenomena 
Some of the phenomena that we have studied with blank predicates are 
extremely robust. The similarity and typicality phenomena, for example, have 
been obtained with preschool children (Lopez, Gunthil, Gelman, & Smith, 1992; 
see also Carey, 1985, and Gelman & Markman, 1987), and with a wide variety of 
categories, including artifacts, number categories, and social categories (Arm- 
strong, 1991; Rothbart & Lewis, 1988; Sloman & Wisniewski, 1992). The 
robustness of the similarity phenomenon would seem to result from its close 
relation to the principle of stimulus generalization (similar stimuli occasion similar 
responses). It is thus of considerable interest that counter-examples to the 
phenomena can be generated by changing the predicates from blank ones to more 
familiar ones. 
Consider the following pair of arguments (where “poodles” refers to “toy 
poodles”): 
(5a) Dobermanns can bite through wire 
German shepherds can bite through wire 
(5b) Poodles can bite through wire 
German shepherds can bite through wire 
Note first that the predicate, can bite through wire, is non-blank. We are 
relatively familiar with its contents, and we can reason about it. Also, it clearly 
meets the criterion for non-blankness that we mentioned earlier: it applies 
differentially to various members of a domain (it applies more to Dobermanns 
than to poodles, for example). What is of particular importance is that, for most 
people, argument (5b) is stronger than argument (5a). The intuition behind this 
judgment seems to be that, “If even poodles can do it, surely German shepherds 
can”. But this judgment violates the similarity phenomenon, since poodles seem 
less similar to German shepherds than do Dobermanns. 
In a like manner, arguments (6a) and (6b) offer a counter-example to the 
typicality phenomenon: 
(6a) Collies can bite through wire 
German shepherds can bite through wire 
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(6b) Poodles can bite through wire 
German shepherds can bite through wire 
Informal judgments favor the second argument as the stronger one, even though 
collies are more typical dogs than poodles are. Arguments (7a) and (7b) provide a 
counter-example to the asymmetry phenomenon described earlier: 
(7a) Collies can bite through wire 
Poodles can bite through wire 
(7b) Poodles can bite through wire 
Collies can bite through wire 
Again, informal judgments find the second argument as stronger (“If poodles can 
do it, likely collies can too”), even though the more typical category appears in 
the premise of argument (7a), not in that of (7b). In like manner, one could 
produce counter-examples to the premise diversity phenomenon. 
What lies behind these counter-examples? As we will see, it is not that 
similarity relations cease to play a role when non-blank predicates are used. 
Rather, similarity is being overshadowed by another factor in these examples- 
the plausibility of the premise- where a less plausible premise, once accepted as 
true, seems to induce greater belief in the corresponding conclusion than does a 
more plausible premise. What we now need to do is to explicate the notion of 
plausibility. 
The gap model 
Basic ideas 
The intuitions that lie behind our model for non-blank predicates are captured 
by the following hypothetical monologue of a subject judging arguments (5b) and 
(5a), respectively: 
“Hmm. Poodles can bite through wire. I thought that to bite through wire, an 
animal had to have powerful jaws. But poodles are kind of weak. 1 guess an 
animal doesn’t have to be that powerful to bite through wire. Then a German 
shepherd is almost certainly powerful enough to do it.” 
“Hmm. Dobermanns can bite through wire. That fits with what I thought, to 
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bite through wire an animal has to have powerful jaws. I’m not sure whether or 
not a German shepherd is powerful enough to do it.” 
The key ideas are: 
(1) The non-blank predicate potentiates a subset of the premise category’s 
attributes (e.g., powerfulness, size). From here on, these are the only relevant 
attributes. The non-blank predicate is associated with one or more of these 
attributes (e.g., powerfulness) and with values on them. 
(2) The premise category (e.g., POODLE) is evaluated to see if its values on 
the relevant attributes are at least as great as those that characterize the 
predicate. The predicate’s values are used as criteria that the category must pass. 
(3) If the premise category’s values are less than those of the predicate (e.g., 
POODLE’s powerfulness level is less than the criterion set up by the predicate), 
the latter are scaled down; otherwise, the predicate’s values are left unchanged 
(as in the Dobermann example). In this way, the plausibility of the premise plays 
a role. 
(4) To the extent that the predicate’s values are scaled down, the conclusion 
category’s values are more likely to be at least as great as those of the predicate, 
and hence the conclusion is likely to be judged more probable. In this way, the 
premise indirectly affects the plausibility of the conclusion. 
These processes differ from those underlying the similarity coverage model in 
that they require a decomposition of the predicate into its constituent attributes 
and values. In the similarity coverage model, a predicate is essentially treated as a 
whole (presumably because it is blank). 
Probability of statements 
We now embody the foregoing intuitive account into an explicit model that 
seems to offer the simplest possible realization of the key ideas. The model can be 
viewed as having two functions, which correspond to estimating the probability of 
an individual statement and estimating the probability of a conclusion of an 
argument given its premises. In what follows, we illustrate how the model works 
by relying on the poodle and Dobermann examples. (For a more extended 
discussion of the model, see Osherson, Smith, Myers, Shafir, & Stob, in press.) 
Let us assume that the categories and predicate of interest have the attribute 
value structure given in Table 2. The values of attributes are assumed to 
correspond to real numbers (this amounts to beliefs being represented by real 
vectors in an appropriate attribute space). Note that the final column in the table 
gives the values of 9 and 9, which represents the powerfulness and size level 
required of an animal to be able to bite through wire. Presumably, these values, 
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Table 2. A. Hypothetical attributes and values associated with three categories 
and one predicate figuring in arguments (5)-(7) 
Poodles Dobermanns German shepherds Can bite through wire 
Powerfulness 3 7 6 9 
Size 2 6 7 9 
B. Hypothetical similarity ratings 
Poodles, German shepherds = .3 
Dobermanns, German shepherds = .6 
unlike the others in the table, are not part of a pre-existing representation. 
Rather, by some knowledge-based processes, people are able to compute such 
attribute-value representations for predicates “on-the-fly”. In essence, people 
may treat the predicate as an ad hoc category (ANIMALS THAT BITE 
THROUGH WIRE), and use whatever knowledge generation processes they 
typically use when constructing such makeshift categories (Barsalou, 1983). 
Consider how the model determines the probability of a statement. For a 
statement to be probable, the values of the category should be at least as great as 
the corresponding values of the predicate. This idea may be quantified with the 
“cut-off” operator 1, defined over real numbers by: 
xLy=Max{O,x-y} 
(Thus 5 A 3 = 2 and 3 L 5 = 0.) Now suppose there are n relevant attributes. 
Letting C designate the vector for the category’s values and P the vector for the 
predicate’s values, the probability of a category-property statement is estimated to 
be: 
1 
1+ i (P, A Ci) 
I=1 
(1) 
where Pi and Cj are the values at the ith coordinate (attribute) of the vectors P 
and C. To illustrate, according to Eq. (1) and Table 2, the probability that 
German shepherds can bite through wire is: 
1 
1+[(916)+(917)] =‘.I7 (2) 
Equation (1) will always yield a number in [0, 11. Probability 1 is attained if 
Ci 2 P, for all attributes, that is, if the category’s values satisfy all the criteria set 
by the predicate (the surplus of C, over P, plays no role in the calculation). Since 
the fundamental entity, P, I Ci, may be conceived as the “gap” between the 
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predicate’s and category’s value on attribute i, the present theory is called the 
“gap model”. These gaps are what lie behind the plausibility (or implausibility) of 
a statement .’ 
Conditional probability of statements 
Now that we know how the gap model assigns a probability to an individual 
statement, we can consider how the model assigns a probability to a conclusion of 
an argument given its premises. Assigning such a conditional probability requires 
a number of steps. These include an initial modification of the argument’s 
predicate due to the impact of the premises, and subsequent estimation of the 
conclusion’s probability. The following example illustrates how these steps are 
implemented in the model.4 
Argument (5b) may be abbreviated as: 
(5b) (POODLE, WIRE) 
(GERMAN SHEPHERD, WIRE) 
where each category is assumed to be represented by its values. In the first step, 
the subject assesses the impact of the premise by comparing the category’s critical 
values to those of the predicate. On the attribute of powerfulness, the relevant 
gap is WIRE-POODLE = (9-3) ( see Table 2). This signifies that poodles do 
not have the powerfulness needed to bite through wire. However, (POODLES, 
WIRE) is a premise, and hence assumed to be true. Therefore animals like 
poodles need not have a powerfulness of 9 to bite through wire. The subject is 
thus led to lower the powerfulness value for WIRE when evaluating the 
conclusion. In doing this, he or she considers not only the gap between WIRE and 
POODLE. but also the similarity between poodles and German shepherds. The 
similarity between the two kinds of dogs approximates the perceived relevance of 
the premise to the conclusion, and thus affects the extent to which the conclusion 
predicate is changed. Hence, the powerfulness value for WIRE is lowered by: 
(WIRE, L POODLE,) x similarity (POODLE, GERMAN SHEPHERD) 
(3) 
‘A potential problem with Eq. (1) is that any addition of an attribute to the category and predicate 
tends to lower the probability of statements, since probability declines with the sum of the gaps. This 
aspect can be changed by taking an average of the gaps. To keep things simple, though, we will leave 
Eq. (1) as is. 
4For an argument with a non-blank predicate, the judged probability of its conclusion given its 
premises is not a pure measure of the argument’s strength. This is because the probability judgment 
may reflect one’s prior belief in the argument’s conclusion as well as the extent to which belief in the 
premises causes one to believe in the conclusion. For this reason, in both our examples and our 
experiments, we usually compare arguments that have the identical conclusion. 
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where the subscript 1 indicates that we are dealing with the first attribute. 
Hypothetical similarity values are provided in the bottom half of Table 2. 
Plugging the relevant numbers into Eq. (3) gives: 
(9 A 3) x 0.3 = 1.8 (4) 
Thus the powerfulness value of WIRE is lowered by 1.8, so the modified value is 
9 - 1.8 or 7.2. 
By a similar logic, the second attribute in Table 2, size, also gives rise to a gap, 
WIRE, A POODLE,. As a consequence, WIRE’s size value is lowered by: 
(9-2)x0.3=2.1 
The modified value for WIRE’s size is therefore 9 - 2.1 or 6.9. 
(5) 
The premise (POODLE, WIRE) has thus modified the WIRE representation 
from its original values of (9, 9) to the new values of (7.2, 6.9). It remains only to 
consider the last step of the process, and calculate the probability of the 
conclusion. This step was explicated in our description of how one estimates the 
probability of individual statements. To implement this step, we need to insert 
into Eq. (1) the two gaps that involve GERMAN SHEPHERD and the modified 
WIRE-namely 7.2 L 6 and 6.9 A 7: 
1 
1 + 1.2 + 0 = o.45 (6) 
Observe that the latter probability exceeds the unconditional probability that 
German shepherds can bite through wire, calculated earlier to be 0.17 (see Eq. 
(2)). The difference is due to the impact of the premise (POODLE, WIRE), 
which changes the subject’s interpretation of WIRE, bringing it into greater 
conformity with the values of POODLE. 
It is instructive to go through comparable calculations for argument (5a), which 
may be abbreviated as: 
(5a) (DOBERMANN, WIRE) 
(GERMAN SHEPHERD, WIRE) 
In assessing the impact of the premise, the gap for powerfulness is (9 1 7) (see 
Table 2). Given that Dobermanns are 0.6 similar to German shepherds (see Table 
2), the powerfulness value of WIRE is lowered by 
(9 A 7) x 0.6 = 1.2 (7) 
This makes the modified powerfulness value of WIRE 9 - 1.2, or 7.8. The gap for 
size is (9 A 6) (see Table 2). Hence the size value of WIRE lowered by: 
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(9:6) x 0.6= 1.8 (8) 
making the size value of WIRE 9 - 1.8, or 7.2. The values for the modified WIRE 
representation are therefore (7.8, 7.2), and the two gaps involving GERMAN 
SHEPHERD and the modified WIRE are consequently 7.8 A 6 and 7.2 :7. 
Inserting these gaps into Eq. (1) gives the probability of the argument’s 
conclusion as 
1 
1 + 1.8 + 0.2 = o’33 
Again the conditional probability exceeds the unconditional probability that 
German shepherds can bite through wire (0.17). The conditional probability 
obtained with DOBERMANN as premise category, 0.33, is less than that 
obtained with POODLE as premise category, 0.45. This fits our informal finding 
that argument (5a) is judged less probable than (5b). 
This convergence of theory and data is merely demonstrational, since the 
critical parameters in Table 2 were generated for purposes of illustration. Indeed, 
small changes in the values of some entries in Table 2 would lead to the 
DOBERMANN argument being predicted to be stronger than the POODLE one 
(e.g., increasing the similarity between Dobermann and German shepherds could 
change the prediction). This implies that, when interpreting data with respect to 
the gap model, we cannot always expect the effect of premise gaps to overwhelm 
that of premise-conclusion similarity; that is, when premise gaps favor one 
argument but premise-conclusion similarity favors another, which argument 
emerges as stronger depends on the specific parameter values. Intuitively, gaps 
capture what has been learned from the premise, similarity reflects the relevance 
of this to the conclusion, and the final impact depends on the magnitudes of both 
factors. 
The fact that the similarity between premise and conclusion plays a key role in 
the gap model provides an important link to the similarity coverage model. In 
both models, something about the premise predicate is generalized to the 
conclusion category to the extent the premise and conclusion categories are 
similar. However, in the similarity coverage model, the predicate - assumed to be 
blank - is left intact, whereas in the gap model the predicate’s values are modified 
before it plays a role in the evaluation of the conclusion.5 
‘Another difference between the two models concerns how similarity between categories is 
computed. In applications of the similarity coverage model, we have assumed that each category is 
intrinsically associated with a large set of attributes, and that similarity between categories is computed 
over all these attributes (Osherson et al., 1991). In applications of the gap model, we have typically 
assumed that only attributes potentiated by the predicate matter, and hence that similarity between 
categories considers only two or three attributes (Osherson et al., in press). In essence, a non-blank 
predicate picks out certain criteria and similarity is computed only with respect to these criteria 
(Medin, Goldstone, & Gentner, 1993). 
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Multiple premises 
The gap model can be extended to deal with arguments containing more than a 
single premise. The basic idea is embodied in a “maximization” principle. 
Specifically, when evaluating the gap for each attribute, every premise category is 
considered and the category with maximal impact is selected for use, where 
“impact” is defined as the product of gap and similarity. To illustrate, suppose 
argument (5a) were enriched to include a premise about collies in addition to that 
about Dobermanns. In calculating the gap on the powerfulness attribute, 
COLLIE will lead to a larger gap than DOBERMANN, assuming that collies are 
judged less powerful than Dobermanns; assuming further that collies and 
Dobermanns are roughly equally similar to German shepherds (the conclusion 
category), COLLIE would then have greater impact than DOBERMANN. 
Hence, by the maximization principle, only the gap due to COLLIE would be 
used to modify the powerfulness value of WIRE. The maximization principle can 
be stated more generally for arguments with any number of predicates. A similar 
proposal, couched in a connectionist architecture, has been made by Sloman 
(1993)! 
This completes our description of the gap model. Its most important psycho- 
logical claims are worth highlighting: 
(1) The mental representations of categories and predicates can in part be 
summarized by attribute value structures (by real vectors in an appropriate 
attribute space). 
(2) A category-predicate statement is judged probable to the extent that the 
values evoked by the predicate are contained in the category. 
(3) An argument’s premises increase the probability of its conclusion by 
lowering the values presumed necessary for possession of the predicate. 
(4) The impact of a premise depends on (a) the gap between its predicate and 
category values, and (b) the similarity of its category to that of the conclusion. 
(5) The impact of multiple premises is governed by the maximization prin- 
ciple. 
Some qualitative results 
To provide an empirical test of the gap model, we asked subjects to judge the 
probabilities of various one-premise arguments. The arguments were selected so 
‘The maximization principle introduces a kind of coverage notion into the gap model. Thus, when 
a second premise is added to an argument, it is unlikely to ever have substantially greater maximal 
impact than the initial premise if its category has similar values to the initial premise category. Hence, 
adding a more diverse premise category can lead to more of a modification in the predicate. Note that 
this notion of coverage differs from that in the similarity coverage model in that it concerns a space of 
features rather than a space of objects. 
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that there would be substantial variation in premise plausibility (which reflects 
premise gaps) and premise-conclusion similarity.’ 
Procedure 
Five different categories of animals were used: house-cats, lions, camels, 
hippos, and elephants. House-cats and lions seem relatively similar to one 
another, as do hippos and elephants; all other couplings yield less similar pairs. 
(These intuitions were supported by subjects’ similarity ratings.) Two different 
predicates were used: have skins that are more resistant to penetration than most 
synthetic fibers and have a visual system that fully adapts to darkness in less than 5 
minutes. Each predicate was used with each category. We expected the first, or 
SKIN, predicate to result in a more plausible proposition when attributed to 
larger animals, such as hippos and elephants, than to smaller ones, such as 
house-cats; we expected the second, or VISUAL, predicate to result in a more 
plausible proposition when attributed to felines than to the other mammals. 
(These expectations were also supported by subjects’ ratings.) 
For each predicate, there are 20 possible one-premise arguments: each of the 5 
categories could appear in the conclusion, with any of the 4 remaining categories 
appearing in the premise. The 20 arguments involving the VISUAL predicate 
were presented before the 20 involving the SKIN predicate. Within each of these 
2 blocks, the 20 arguments appeared in random order. 
On each trial, the subject was first presented the conclusion of the argument, 
and asked to rate on an 11-point scale how likely it was that the statement was 
true (where 0 indicated the statement was definitely not true and 10 indicated the 
statement was definitely true). Then the premise was presented, and subjects 
were instructed to consider it true. Subjects then reported how likely it was that 
the original claim (the conclusion) was true given the new information. After 
completing their probability ratings, subjects rated the similarity of all pairs of 
animals on an 11-point scale (where 0 indicated minimal similarity, and 10 
maximum similarity). The subjects were 20 University of Michigan under- 
graduates who were paid for their participation. 
Results 
Table 3 gives the probability estimates for the SKIN predicate. These estimates 
were derived by first averaging over the 20 subjects, and then dividing each 
average by 10 to yield a number between 0 and 1. The first column of the table 
presents the data for cases in which a conclusion was presented alone. The next 
four columns indicate how the probabilities changed when each possible premise 
was added. To illustrate, consider the first row of Table 3, which contains the data 
for arguments in which house-cats served as the conclusion. The .40 in the first 
‘We are indebted to Kevin Biolsi for his assistance in all aspects of the following experiments 
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Table 3. Probability estimates for arguments with predicate, Have skins that are 
more resistant to penetration than most synthetic fibers 
Conclusion alone With premise 
House-cats Lions Camels Hippos Elephants 
.40 .s9 .47 .41 .3x 
Lions House-cats Camels Hippos Elephants 
.55 .80 .61 .53 .53 
Camels House-cats Lions Hippos Elephants 
.60 .77 .73 .60 .60 
Hippos House-cats Lions Camels Elephants 
.79 .93 .78 .82 .85 
Elephants House-cats Lions Camels Hippos 
.80 .80 .8O .86 .87 





















column means that the probability attributed to the statement HOUSE-CAT 
SKIN when it appeared alone was .40. Adding the premise of LION SKIN 
boosted the probability of the HOUSE-CAT SKIN conclusion to .59; adding the 
premise CAMEL SKIN boosted the probability of the conclusion to .47; and so 
on. The bottom of the table contains the average pairwise similarity ratings for 
the five animals; these ratings will be needed in interpreting the probability 
estimates.x 
Some points of interest can be gleaned from looking just at the first column of 
the top of the table- just at the probabilities attributed to the conclusions when 
they appeared alone. The SKIN property is non-blank, since the probability with 
which it is attributed to the five mammals ranges from .40 to .80. Because each of 
these statements also serves as a premise (in an argument with a different 
conclusion), there is also a substantial variation in premise plausibility. In 
particular, the premise involving house-cats is the least plausible, whereas the 
premises involving hippos and elephants are the most plausible. (Within each 
row, the premises are increasingly plausible as one moves from left to right.) 
The more implausible a premise, the larger the premise gaps. The clearest 
evidence for the effect of gaps per se on judgments would come from cases where 
premise implausibility varies but premise-conclusion similarity remains relatively 
“Ideally, we should have obtained two sets of similarity ratings for these animals, one in the 
context of the SKIN predicate and the other in the context of the VISUAL predicate (see footnote 5). 
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constant. The row corresponding to camels at the top of Table 3 comes the closest 
to offering such a case, as there is relatively little variation in similarity ratings 
involving camels (see the bottom of Table 3). The probabilities assigned to 
arguments with CAMEL SKIN as their conclusion in fact monotonically decrease 
as the premise becomes more plausible; this is clear-cut evidence for a gap 
mechanism. In two of the other rows of Table 3 - those which have house-cats or 
lions in their conclusion - premise implausibility is positively correlated with 
premise-conclusion similarity; that is, in these two rows, as one moves across the 
premises from left to right, the premise becomes both more plausible and less 
similar to the conclusion. In these cases the gap model unequivocally predicts that 
probabilities should decline in moving from left to right, and this prediction is 
supported in both rows of interest. In the remaining two rows - those corre- 
sponding to hippos and elephants - premise implausibility and premise-conclusion 
similarity point in opposite directions (as the former decreases, the latter 
increases). In such cases the gap model makes no clear prediction (since the 
critical commodity in the model is the product of gap and similarity). For the row 
corresponding to elephants, similarity seems to dominate, as the estimated 
probabilities consistently increase with premise-conclusion similarity. For the row 
corresponding to hippos, the largest estimated probability goes with the most 
implausible premise, but aside from that the estimated probabilities track 
similarity. 
The preceding observations received statistical support in a stepwise regression 
analysis. The dependent measure was the change in the probability of a 
conclusion occasioned by the addition of a premise (this eliminated the influence 
that prior belief in a conclusion has on the conditional probability judgments). 
Premise-conclusion similarity entered the regression model first, and the only 
other factor in the final model was the interaction between similarity and 
plausibility. The coefficient for the similarity factor was .74 (p < .Ol), and that for 
the interaction factor was -.09 (p < .05); the multiple correlation was R = .70 
(F(3, 16) = 5.22, p = .Ol). The form of the interaction was that the effect of 
implausibility was greater for more similar premise-conclusion pairs; exactly this 
kind of interaction is predicted by the gap model because implausibility (gap) is 
multiplied by similarity. 
Table 4 presents the comparable data for the VISUAL predicate. There is 
substantial variation in the probability of the predicate being attributed to the 
various animals, from .42 to .79, which means there is substantial variation in 
premise plausibility. (Again, within each row, the premises increase in plausibility 
as one moves from left to right, but now the felines are associated with high 
plausibility whereas the hippos and elephants are associated with low plausibility.) 
As before, first we consider the results for arguments that have camels in their 
conclusions, this being the closest we can come to a case where premise- 
conclusion similarity remains constant. Although there is not much variation in 
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Table 4. Probability estimates for arguments with predicate, Have a visual system 





















































the judgments in the relevant row, there is at least some indication of a decline in 
probability estimates as the premise becomes more plausible. Moving to the first 
two rows of Table 4, those for hippos and elephants, we have cases in which both 
premise implausibility and similarity decline as one moves across the premises. 
Probability estimates systematically decline as one moves from left to right, as 
predicted by the gap model. In the last rows, which contain the data for lions and 
house-cats, plausibility and similarity point in opposite directions. In both of these 
cases, similarity seems to dominate. Thus, overall, premise-conclusion similarity 
seems to be playing a somewhat greater role in these data than in the data for the 
SKIN predicate considered previously. 
A stepwise regression analysis again provides statistical support for our 
qualitative observations. Using increments in probability estimates as the depen- 
dent measure, the first factor to enter the model was premise-conclusion 
similarity, and the other factor in the final model was the interaction between 
similarity and plausibility. The coefficient for similarity was .52 (p < .Ol), that for 
the interaction was -.04 (p < .Ol), and the multiple correlation was .89 (F(2, 
17) = 32.92, p < .Ol). Again, the form of the interaction was that predicted by the 
gap model, the effect of implausibility being greater when premise-conclusion 
similarity is greater. One last result is worth noting because it supports our 
observation that premise-conclusion similarity played a greater role with the 
VISUAL than the SKIN predicate. The simple correlation between similarity and 
probability estimates was .83 for the data obtained with the VISUAL predicate, 
versus .57 for the SKIN data. This difference in correlation is significant (p < 
.OS). 
Why did the similarity factor dominate the plausibility factor more with the 
VISUAL predicate than the SKIN predicate ? Two possible answers are worth 
considering. One possibility is that whether premise-conclusion similarity domi- 
nates implausibility (or vice versa) depends on the specific values of the relevant 
attributes and the specific values of the pairwise similarities (see p. 83). Thus, the 
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particular values for our five animals on the relevant attributes of SKIN (e.g., 
size) may have been such as to produce a dominance of implausibility, whereas 
those on the attributes of VISUAL (e.g., nocturnal) may have produced a 
dominance of similarity. Alternatively, the SKIN and VISUAL predicates may 
differ in important qualitative respects. For example, the SKIN predicate seems 
to involve a continuous variation on an attribute like size - animals with very 
impenetrable skins tend to be large (elephant), those with medium impenetrable 
skin tend to be of medium size (lion), and those with relatively penetrable skin 
tend to be small (house-cat). In contrast, the VISUAL predicate may involve 
more of a threshold variation on some underlining attribute - either an animal has 
enough of this attribute to fully adapt to darkness in less than 5 minutes or it does 
not. If such a qualitative difference in predicates was the case, the gap model 
would likely provide a better account of the predicate associated with continuous 
variation because this is the kind of variation assumed in the model. 
Some quantitative results 
Having provided some qualitative support for the gap model, we now consider 
quantitative evidence. We are interested in the model’s ability to make predictions 
about subjects’ probability judgments for various arguments. This issue has been 
investigated in an experiment by Osherson, Smith, Myers, Shafir, and Stob (in 
press), and in what follows we describe some of their major findings. 
Procedure 
The materials included the 5 categories and 2 predicates used in the previous 
experiment, along with a new set of 5 categories and 2 predicates. The 5 new 
categories of animals were bears, beavers, squirrels, monkeys, and gorillas; the 2 
new predicates were have three distinct layers of fat tissue surrounding vital organs 
(hereafter, abbreviated as FAT) and have over 80% of their brain surface devoted 
to neocortex (hereafter, NEOCORTEX). We will refer to the new material as 
“Set 2”, and to the ones taken from Experiment 1 as “Set 1”. Note that, as is the 
case with Set 1, Set 2 provides variations in similarity (e.g., bears are similar to 
beavers, and monkeys to gorillas), and in the applicability of the predicate to the 
category (e.g., FAT applies better to bears than to monkeys, whereas NEO- 
CORTEX shows the reverse pattern). 
More arguments were used in this study than the previous one. The arguments 
were constructed from the materials within a set in the same manner as in the 
previous study (i.e., a premise or conclusion of an argument consisted of a pairing 
of one of the categories with a predicate). For each .predicate, there were : (i) 5 
zero-premise arguments, that is, 5 cases where only a conclusion appeared; (ii) 20 
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one-premise arguments; (iii) 30 two-premise arguments; (iv) 20 three-premise 
arguments; and (v) 5 four-premise arguments. Hence, there were 80 arguments 
per predicate (which exhausts all the possibilities with 5 categories), for a total of 
160 different arguments for each set. 
Each subject made probability judgments about 160 arguments, presented in 
random order. Half the subjects worked with arguments constructed from Set 1, 
and the other half worked with arguments from Set 2. The phrasing of the 
probability question differed from that in the previous study. Now the entire 
argument was presented at once, and subjects were simply asked, “What is the 
probability that [the conclusion is true] given that [the premises are true]?” The 
“given that” clause did not appear for zero-premise arguments. The subjects were 
30 University of Michigan undergraduates who were paid for their participation. 
Results 
To fit the gap model to an individual subject’s data we need to know the 
attribute values of the relevant categories and predicates for that subject. These 
values were estimated by the following four-step procedure. 
(1) The 160 arguments evaluated by a given subject were divided into two sets 
of 80 corresponding to the predicate appearing therein. Each set of 80 arguments 
was treated separately; this essentially divided each subject into two halves, and 
in what follows we refer to these 60 data sets (2 for each of our 30 subjects) as 
“half-subjects.” 
(2) The 80 arguments of a given half-subject were again partitioned into two 
sets. One set was used to fix the parameters of the gap model (as described 
below); these are the “fixing” arguments. The other set was used to test the 
predictions of the model once its parameters were fixed; these are the “testing” 
arguments. Different kinds of partitions were used, but we will focus on those in 
which either 20, 30, or 50 randomly selected arguments were used as the fixing 
arguments, and the remaining 60, 50, or 30 arguments served as the testing 
arguments. 
(3) We assumed that each category and predicate could be represented by just 
two attributes. This means that the 5 categories and 1 predicate appearing in the 
80 arguments of a half-subject are each associated with 2 values, for 12 values in 
all. These 12 values were the parameters to be determined. For each half-subject, 
a procedure was employed to find values of the 12 free parameters that maximize 
the gap model’s fit to the fixing arguments. To illustrate, consider the partition in 
which the fixing set contained 20 fixing arguments. Choice of the 12 parameters 
caused the gap model to assign probabilities to each of the 20 fixing arguments. 
These predicted probabilities were then compared to those produced by a given 
subject for the 20 arguments, and the correlation between the predicted and 
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observed probabilities provided a measure of goodness to fit. The set of 12 
parameters that maximized this correlation was retained for use in the next step. 
(4) Once the best set of 12 parameters - associated with a given half-subject 
and a given partition of arguments-was obtained, the gap model with those 
parameters was applied to the testing arguments of the partition in question. The 
probabilities generated by the model were compared to the corresponding 
probabilities generated by the subject, with the correlation between predicted and 
observed probabilities providing a measure of goodness of fit of the model. Note 
that there are no free parameters in this last step. 
Table 5 provides the results of our model fitting. The first column specifies how 
many fixing arguments were used, and the second gives the median correlation 
obtained in step (4) over all 60 half-subjects. Even with only 20 fixing arguments, 
the correlation between predicted and observed probability estimates is .72. The 
correlation rises with more fixing arguments. A question of some interest is, to 
what extent are these good fits dependent on similarity playing a role? To answer 
this question, we considered a variant of the gap model that contained no 
similarity factor, and fit this variant to the data using our four-step procedure. 
The results of these fits are in parentheses in Table 5. In all cases, the fit of the 
model to data is significantly poorer when similarity no longer plays a role. This is 
further evidence that similarity is an important element in modelling judgments 
about non-blank predicates, just as it was in modelling judgments about blank 
predicates. 
An alternative procedure for fitting the model involves first obtaining subjects’ 
estimates of values for the relevant attributes; then the model can be fit to data 
with no free parameters. We have done some preliminary work with this 
procedure. After making probability judgments as in the preceding experiment, 
subjects were presented with a list of 30 attributes that had been preselected to be 
appropriate to the categories and predicates of interest. They rated the extent to 
which each attribute characterizes each category or predicate. Using these 
estimated values to predict the subjects’ probability judgments, we found 
correlations between predicted and obtained probability that generally range 
Table 5. Median correlations between predicted and ob- 
served probability estimates for different parti- 
tions of fixing and testing arguments (numbers in 
parentheses are for a variant of the gap model in 
which similarity plays no role) 
Number of arguments 
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between .40 and .50. This is substantially lower than the correlations reported in 
Table 5. Higher correlations may be obtained with the present procedure by 
allowing the relevant attributes to vary with the arguments, rather than using a 
single list of attributes for all arguments (in which case, some attributes may not 
be relevant for many of the arguments). Additional studies are envisioned in 
which we employ more sensitive techniques for determining what attributes figure 
in subjects’ judgments of particular arguments. 
Concluding comments 
Summary 
Estimating the likelihood of a proposition on the basis of previous information 
can be thought of as assigning a probability to the conclusion of an argument 
based on its premises. We have explored two kinds of psychological factors that 
influence such probability assignment. First, in the context of blank predicates, we 
showed that argument strength depends on similarity relations between premise 
and conclusion categories. These relations were captured in the similarity 
coverage model, which explains a number of robust qualitative effects, including 
the premise-conclusion similarity and premise typicality phenomena. Counter- 
examples to these phenomena, however, were shown to arise in the context of 
predicates that are non-blank. Unlike the case with blank predicates, in which 
little is known about the predicate, subjects presented with non-blank predicates 
are likely to reason about the nature of the predicate and its plausibility vis-&vis 
the category. Indeed, argument strength with non-blank predicates was shown to 
be a function of the premises’ and conclusion’s plausibility, in addition to category 
similarity. As reflected in the gap model, the perceived implausibility of premises 
captures how much has been learned from the fact that they are supposedly true, 
and the similarity between premise and conclusion categories reflects the rele- 
vance of what has been learned to the argument’s conclusion. 
In moving from blank to non-blank predicates, the reasoner’s reliance on 
similarity decreases. Indeed, for some non-blank predicates, similarity seems to 
play no role at all. To illustrate, consider the following arguments: 
(8a) A rhino can break this kind of scale 
An elephant can break this kind of scale 
(8b) A refrigerator can break this kind of scale 
An elephant can break this kind of scale 
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Both arguments seem equally strong despite the fact that premise-conclusion 
similarity is far greater in the first than the second case (presumably premise 
plausibility is comparable in the two arguments). In these cases, there is little or 
no uncertainty about which attributes are critical (i.e., weight seems to underly 
the predicate), and consequently there seems to be no need to consider the 
similarity between premise and conclusion categories (Douglas Medin, personal 
communication). More generally, it appears that: a high degree of confidence 
about the critical attribute, as in the preceding example, leads to an almost total 
reliance on premise plausibility; a lack of confidence about the critical attributes, 
as with blank predicates, leads to an almost exclusive reliance on similarity; and a 
limited degree of confidence about the critical attributes, as with most of the 
non-blank predicates considered in this paper, leads to a reliance on both 
plausibility and similarity. In this manner, we can see the connection between the 
gap model and the similarity coverage model. 
Possible extensions 
In what follows, we briefly note three possible extensions of our analysis of 
non-blank predicates. 
Thus far, we have assumed that similarities are never negative. Some category 
pairs, however, may be perceived as more different than they are similar, which 
suggests they may be perceived as negatively similar (this suggestion is compatible 
with Tversky’s, 1977, contrast model of similarity). Negative similarities seem 
especially possible when the predicates are non-blank. A non-blank predicate may 
be associated with only one or two attributes, and if two categories have values at 
the extremes of these attributes they may be perceived as contraries. To the 
extent that similarity is assumed to reflect the relevance of premise to conclusion, 
it may be that a similarity score around zero entails little or no relevance, whereas 
high positive and high negative similarities both reflect great relevance, but of 
opposite sorts. Thus, assuming we believe that mice and squirrels have similar 
eating preferences whereas mice and lions have very different preferences, we 
may think that the fact that mice love onions increases the chances that squirrels 
love them, but also increases the chances that lions do not. The introduction of 
negative similarities to the gap model has a number of interesting implications 
that we have only begun to explore. 
A second extension of the gap model stems from its prediction that the 
addition of a premise can never lower the probability of a conclusion. That is, 
given the model’s particular cut-off operator and its notion of critical values, an 
additional premise can only increase the strength of a conclusion (when non- 
negative gaps occur and when similarity is relatively high), or leave it unchanged 
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(when the gaps are negligible or when similarity is relatively low). However, as 
demonstrated by Osherson et al. (1990), premises may sometimes lower conclu- 
sion probability when blank predicates are used, and this seems all the more likely 
with non-blank predicates. One way to remedy this potential problem is to 
introduce into the gap model coverage principles like those used in the similarity 
coverage model, since an additional premise may change the inclusive category 
(currently, the gap model makes no use of category structure). Another way to 
account for decreasing belief with increasing premises is to change the particular 
fashion in which attribute values are compared (i.e., replace the cut-off operator); 
and still another possible change is the introduction of negative similarities, as 
described above. If any of these changes were implemented, the model would be 
able to predict an occasional lowering of belief in an argument’s conclusion with 
additional premises. 
A third elaboration of our model stems from an extension of our paradigm. Up 
to this point we have used arguments in which the categories vary but the 
predicate remains fixed. It is equally possible to entertain arguments in which the 
category is fixed but the predicates vary, and strength variations in such 
arguments may also be captured by the gap model. Consider, for example, 
arguments (9a) and (9b): 
(9a) Geese can attain flight speeds of 110 miles per hour 
Geese can develop a “lift” in excess of twice their body weight by agitating 
their wings 
(9b) Geese can develop a “lift” in excess of twice their body weight by agitating 
their wings 
Geese can attain flight speeds of 110 miles per hour 
Intuitively, (9a) seems stronger than (9b). This fits with the key ideas behind 
the gap model; the proposition about flight speeds seems more implausible than 
that about “lift”, and an argument is judged stronger when the more implausible 
proposition is in the premise rather than the conclusion. However, whereas the 
fixed-predicate type of argument naturally leads us to a gap-induced modification 
of the shared predicate (which is then transferred to the conclusion), the current, 
fixed-category argument seems likely to involve modification of the shared 
category. That is, while in our previous discussion people were assumed to adjust 
a predicate’s critical values in light of the categories that are seen to possess the 
predicate, the envisioned extension of the gap model would incorporate changes 
in the values of the category in light of the predicates that it is said to possess. 
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Finally, arguments that involve both varied categories and predicates would 
require a model that incorporates both kinds of adjustment processes. 
A final comment 
Reasoning and decision making require the constant estimation and readjust- 
ment of the probabilities of propositions. Our subjective probability estimates, 
based on what we have come to know and believe so far, affect the ways in which 
we reason about future outcomes, and the decisions that we make. The discovery 
of facts previously considered implausible lead us to adjust our views in more 
substantial ways than facts that we do not find surprising. The ways in which we 
adjust our views depend largely on our categorization schemes, and on the 
similarities that we perceive between the categories under consideration. Further 
work in the cognitive and decision sciences should help clarify the ways in which 
plausibility and similarity affect inductive inference and judgments of probability. 
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